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The task of democratizing Africa has become one of the least tenable projects 
of the contemporary era. Often, African democratization has been marked by 
bloody électoral contests, bloody coups d'état, brazen abuse of power and 
ofher unimaginable magnitude of ills. In view of such obstacles to democracy, 
one may wonder what positive results can be expected of this type of demo-
cracy in Africa. In spite of this, the West has not relented in forcing one form 
of the Western democratie model or anofher on African peoples. 
In the process of decolonization, independence movements were 
confronted with demands made by French and British colonizers that a 
parliamentary democracy, following the Gaullist and Westminster model 
respectively, be instituted as a prerequisite for independence.1 Similarly, the 
current stand of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and fhe World Bank is 
to make fhe acceptance of the Western-style 'multi-party democracy' a 
prerequisite for economie aid to African countries. Both are on this basis said 
to have become 'extremely interested in doing what they can to promote 
democratization.'2 This situation has been referred to as 'a continuing neo-
colonialism from a perspective of total fiscal dependency.'3 Though critical of 
the imperialistic character of democratization, Wim van Binsbergen asserted 
that 
in fhe contemporary global discourse, 'democracy' has corne to 
occupy an important place. It often carries deep emotional 
significance. It has acquired great mobilizing power. In the 
course of the twentieth Century, many fhousands of people have 
been prepared to die in struggles legitimated by référence to this 
symbol; many more people have admired others making such 
sacrifices in the name of democracy and spurred them on. 
Democracy has become a major export item of the USA and the 
N A T O . 4 
Interestingly, in all these instances, the Western multi-party democracy is 
treated as the only alternative model and enormous efforts are made to force it 
to work. In this article, therefore, I will focus on the plight of this brand of 
democracy in Africa. This will be followed by a reflection on the tenets of 
African consensus democracy. Finally, fhe task of democracy in contemporary 
Africa will be highlighted with a view to making suggestions on how to 
enhance the democratization process in Africa. It will be shown that neither 
the Western nor the African model alone can sufficiently address the 
contemporary problems in Africa. On the contrary, relevant elements of both 
models can be utilized to construct a democratie model which is capable of 
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solving the présent problems. Certainly, such a model would be die best 
démocratisation option in contemporary Africa. 
The plight of Western démocratie models in Africa 
The problems of the Western models of demoeraey in Africa are often ignored 
or taken less seriously when demoeraey in gênerai is compared with military 
dictatorship. As people like Chuba Okadigbo would put it 'we are trying to 
maintain the reign of the ballot, so as to obviate the tyranny of the bullet.'5 
Under such a frame of mind, no amount of blood which flows in the process 
of demoeratization arouses the question of 'Why?' Especially in Africa, it is 
unclear whether the bullet or the ballot has claimed more lives. In April 1994, 
in a matter of two weeks, over 100,000 people were reported killed in 
Rwanda.6 South Africa keeps on losing lives with the least possibility of ever 
enthroning a viable demoeraey. But how many lives have been lost in the 
process of demoeratization or under the military régimes is not the subject to 
be treated in this paper. The présent concern is to examine the suitability of 
Western démocratie models in contemporary Africa. Why has this type of 
demoeratization led to so many inter-groups clashes all over Africa? Why has 
it been so bloody, and with so little hope of abating? 
Another issue is what has been referred to as the Western, 'most 
standard' définition of demoeraey itself, aecording to which demoeraey is a 
System based on compétitive parties, in which the governing majority respects 
the rights of minorities. Discussion on the démocratie System accordingly 
focuses on the concepts of représentation, majority raie, opposition, compéti-
tion, alternative government, control and the like, but hardly ever on the 
notion of self-governing principles.7 Western models of demoeraey clearly 
reflect a form of structural opposition, which may be less suitable for Africa. 
What, actually, is wrong with the notion of 'self-governing principles'? In 
other words why is intrinsic opposition necessary? How compatible are thèse 
features of Western demoeraey with the contemporary multi-ethnic African 
countries? 
In an attempt to answer the above questions, it is important to assert 
that the analysis is limited mainly to the multi-party System which has become 
the most populär of the partisan models of demoeraey. It has been noted that 
'in the more récent literature there are very few instances of authors propaga-
ting a return to a single-party or no-party system on the grounds of ethnie 
arguments.'8 
Several African countries have continually, but with little or no success, tried 
to make différent forms of Western partisan majority rule demoeraey to work. 
Nigeria already experimented with différent types of multi-party demoeraey, to 
which several modifications or changes have been made. 
In the Nigérian first republic, which lasted from independence in 1960 
until the first military take-over in 1966, political parties were formed de facto 
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on regional basis. Nigeria, in those days, was divided into three régions, the 
North, the East and the West. Each of the three régions was the home of one 
of the three major ethnie groups in Nigeria, while the three major political 
parties likewise each dominated a région: the Hausa/Fulani NPC in the North, 
Igbo N C N C in the East, and Yoruba A G in the West. However, during the 
colonial era, the British had structured thèse régions in such a way that the 
Northern Region controlled a comfortable majority. This was also reflected in 
the mode of allocation of seats in the parliament, which was a reproduction of 
the Western concept of an 'absolute majority'. In thèse circumstances, given 
the per capita principle of democracy which was adopted in Nigeria, the NPC 
only had to secure the 174 seats allocated to the Northern région in a 320-
member House of Représentatives, to perpetually rule at the centre. This was 
facilitated by the cabinet System of government - which regarded the party 
with most seats as the ruling party - which was operated at the time. The 
greatest threat to the stability and survival of the Nigérian fédération was the 
prépondérance of the old Northern Region, both in size and population.9 As a 
resuit of this structural imbalance, this form of Western democracy collapsed 
in Nigeria, ending in the first military coup d'état, which the plotters claimed 
was meant to restore sanity to the country. A second coup followed, and a 
bloody Civil War (1967-1970) followed, in which the Igbo-dominated Eastern 
Region tried to secede from the Nigérian fédération and establish a new 
republic under the name of Biafra. 
In order to remedy the above problems, the military government 
reviewed the geo-political structure of the country. Initially, twelve différent 
states were created out of the former three régions, while additional structural 
changes increased the number to nineteen. The change from the Westminster 
parliamentary democracy to the American presidential democracy was major. 
Despite that, the structural imbalance remained. Hence, the Second Republic 
democracy suffered from the same problems as the First. Again, three major 
political parties dominated the political scène. The National Party of Nigeria 
(NPN) had its base in the North, the Nigérian Peoples Party (NPP) in the 
East, and the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) in the West. Next to thèse 
operated two minor political parties. Each of thèse five parties presented a 
presidential candidate. During the first élections held in the new System, the 
northern based NPN won a greater number of votes than any of the other 
parties, but a constitutional crisis arose over whether or not the declared 
figures of the élection were décisive. The leading candidate won 33.76% of 
the votes east and also obtained one-quarter of the votes in 12 states.10 
However, the constitution required a winning candidate to cover at least two-
third of the 19 states which was 12.66. There would have been little or no 
problem if the winner had managed to secure thirteen states, but now the other 
political parties (which together controlled 66.24% of the votes east) 
maintained that no winner had emerged. Their protest was ignored. This 
incident did not help to lessen the tension between the major ethnie groups. 
Consequently, partisan factors became very prominent in the perfor-
mance of the controversial président. This was evident in his appointment of 
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ministers and it was noted that the composition of the cabinet revealed a 
'disturbing inability or sheer unwillingness to expand the scope of search for 
responsible and useful Nigerians other than those who took him into office and 
propped him there.'11 By the second round of elections a lot of damage had 
already been done and the Nigerian second multi-party democracy vanished 
into another period of military rule. Clearly, in Nigeria the multi-party 
democratic system has failed to generate enough solidarity among the compo-
nent groups to function. 
The Babangida military government made further structural adjust-
ments, increasing the number of states to the present thirty. Also, a new form 
of democracy was introduced; instead of the multi-party option, a two-party 
form of Western democracy was imposed on Nigeria. This Third Republic 
also woefully failed even before it was fully established. The results of the 
June 1993 presidential elections were annulled by the military government and 
instead of the president elect, an interim administration was mandated to run 
the affairs of the country. When the interim president announced his resignati-
on, another military regime seized power. 
The defunct republic of Biafra, which was essentially Igbo, remains a 
lasting evidence of how formidable an ethnic group can be. Its living example 
is the independence of Eritrea. Just as Eritrea and Ethiopia merged at a certain 
time, northern and southern Nigeria became one political entity only in 1914. 
Just as Eritrea has broken away, the Igbo or the south is still trying to do the 
same. 
The Nigerian experiments with Western democracy have been characterized as 
a 'vicious circle of a collapsing democracy.'12 Democracy likewise collapsed 
in other African countries. In the Ethiopian democratic experiment, ethnic 
groups were given the names of political parties. The reason why the formati-
on of political parties along ethnic lines was permitted in Ethiopia must have 
been to encourage equal participation of these ethnic groups in the decision-
making process. Not long after it became very obvious that the arrangement 
was incapable of leading to the promised land. It was mere freedom of 
association and individual voting equality. Thus the Ethiopian multi-party 
democracy collapsed. That the Ethiopian multi-party democracy ended in a 
fiasco,13 is as understandable as the collapse of democracy in Nigeria since, in 
essence, both situations are significantly comparable (although in the Ethiopian 
case it was explicitly intended that the political parties were ethnically based, 
while in Nigeria this intention was absent). In fact, Western multi-party 
democracy is such that the more multiple the parties, the more problematic the 
model becomes. Many African and even European countries often have to 
grapple with this problem. In the Netherlands, at a certain time there were 
about seventy political parties. Reference can also be made to Gabon or Zaire 
where at a certain moment more than a hundred political parties existed.14 
What happened in Gabon or Zaire may be 'tragi-comical' but also one of the 
logical results of the Western multi-party democracy in a multi-national polity. 
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Another phenomenon of Western democracy which -ought to be stressed is that 
of institutionalized or structural opposition. To be in government tends to be a 
guarantee of a good life which could be totally lost as a member of the 
opposition. The problems arising from structural opposition were long identi-
fied but ignored. It is not surprising that in Benin losing parties were ready to 
disappear into the party in power, rather than accept fhe fate of an opposition 
party. 
Just a few years after independence, fhe first and only Prime Minister 
of Nigeria, Sir Abubaka Tafewa Balewa, asserted as follows: Tn Nigeria, no 
party can agrée to be in opposition for long.' 1 5 As Emeka Anyaoku put it: T 
do not know of any African language whose political lexicon includes fhe 
concept of a "leader of the loyal opposition". Instead there is a clear concept 
of a political enemy.'16 Shortly after Balewa made fhe above remarks he was 
killed in a process which culminated in fhe Nigérian civil war. One question 
asked by Balewa remains very vital: 'democracy, democracy - what is it? 
There is American democracy, British democracy - why not Nigérian demo-
cracy?' 1 7 Strangely enough, like many African countries Nigeria has limited its 
democratization process to the copying of one alien brand of democracy or the 
ofher. Many argue that copying might not be fhe problem. I.B. Bello-Imam, 
for example, observed that 
whereas the cabinet System of government is still flourishing in 
Britain it had failed in Nigeria. In the same manner, whereas 
the presidential System is vibrating and developing wifh time in 
America, its opération in Nigeria was being greeted wifh scepti-
cism. The logical conclusion therefore is that the type of go-
vernment is not the problem. The problem is wifh the Operators 
of fhe system. It has nothing to do wifh colour, éducation and 
race. It has to do wifh the attitude of mind. 1 8 
This type of conclusion has its own far-reaching implications. It assumes that 
the Western brand of democracy might be or is perfectly alright everywhere. 
However, in my opinion, the type of government might be fhe main problem 
in Africa, and Bello-Imam's conclusion is largely questionable. 
Those who tend to consider Western democracy the best alternative 
form of democracy, often argue that the failure of Western democracy in 
Africa must be due to fhe level of development of fhe respective African 
countries. This concerns certain aspects of both the level of material and 
human development. Recently, for example, Marie P. Eboh asserted that 
'there cannot be political stability wifhout economic stability.'1 9 Likewise 
Founou-Tchuigoua was said to have argued that 'economic growfh always 
précèdes the development of democracy, and that there is no ofher viable 
séquence.' 2 0 This is the type of view which people like G. M . Carew rightly 
devote much time to réfute.2 1 According to Buijtenhuis et al, 'more and more 
Statistical analyses are becoming available that demonstrate that there is no 
direct relation between fhe type of regime and economic growth. ' 2 2 
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Undeniably, however, economic growth requires a certain favourable 
condition. In Nigeria, the présent political instability and lack of accountability 
are unfavourable for the required economic progress. Therefore, if economic 
crisis must be arrested before democracy can be established, then a solution to 
the huge debt bürden cannot come from within the country. In my opinion, 
economic crisis calls for the establishment of an appropriate démocratie 
tradition which guarantees the political stability necessary for economic growth 
or recovery. The view that there must be economic growth prior to the 
institutionalization of democracy arises essentially from a dependency philos-
ophy. The theoretical and practical validity of such a position seems highly 
doubtful. It is a lazy man's call for economic aids, and a trap by the money 
lender for an opportunity to eut 'a pound of flesh'. However, expérience has 
shown that as long as socio-political crisis under such Western démocratie 
models continues, economic instability deepens and borrowing becomes more 
urgent. Despite the présent economic crisis, a country like Nigeria, endowed 
with such an abundance of human and material resources does not need to 
borrow a kobo ('cent'). 
A very subtle aspect of the above controversy over whether there must be 
development before democracy or vice versa concerns the existence of ethnie 
groups in most African countries. The idea of development has come to 
include the need to transform Africans into something modern, European or 
Western. In the words of Ben Naanen, ' A common liberal perspective is to 
view ethnicity as an anachronism, a kind of primordial hangover which was 
obstruetionist to the ideals of a modern State.'23 As Carew put it, 'The basis of 
liberalism's hostility towards ethnopolitical identities can be found in the 
liberal ontology which treats attributes and qualities as properties of individu-
als, not groups. It coneeives groups as simple aggregates of individuals with 
their respective properties; a group is thus ultimately reducible to indivi-
duals.'2 4 Efforts were accordingly made to see that ethnicity would eventually 
be superseded by modern forms of social relations based on economic or 
political ties. This project appears to have woefully failed. Instead, the reality 
of the ethnie groups has become more undeniable. In fact, a world wide 
'identity explosion' has led to demands from ethnie groups for greater partici-
pation in decision-making processes, especially in developing countries. 
Therefore, any demand for the multi-party System clearly brings the ethnie 
question to the fore.25 In certain ways, these facts seem to have convinced the 
West that such groups have basic rights.26 However, despite such an aware-
ness, the démocratie criteria as well as the erected structures have not yet been 
accordingly reviewed. The choice of political leaders is still based on the 
quantitative one person one vote game of numbers. Similarly, décisions are 
still based on the partisan forms of majority rule democracy. A l l the structures 
of domination and oppression are thereby still left intact. 
The fear of domination is very real under the Western multi-party 
démocratie models. Carew tried to solve this problem by the introduction of 
his 'fairness principle'. But the fairness principle cannot remove the fear of 
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domination and oppression either. It does not give the minority any legal or 
constitutional but mere moral protection. This is grossly inadéquate in contem-
porary Africa. In his opinion, 'the majority rule principle need not be the 
automatic choice as a décision rule for every démocratie Community.'27 Still, it 
is a mere call on the majority not to use the structures of domination and 
oppression at its disposai but to be fair or just and it leaves the minority at the 
mercy of the majority. Certainly such an appeal can achieve only very Iittle. 
People who perpetuate injustice do so hardly out of ignorance but with füll 
knowledge. The need to apply the majority rule principle must be decided only 
by consensus. The contrary is an absurdity. This is why it is ridiculous to 
leave it at the disposai of the government to décide when a référendum has 
become necessary. As a matter of fact, in hardly any community should the 
majority rule principle be the automatic choice as a décision rule on every 
issue every time. Under the multi-party demoeraey such a principle can or 
does allow the minority or the opposition unrestricted freedom of speech but 
with little or no influence. In fact, as has been shown it can also leave a larger 
segment of the community powerless since a certain form of majority raie 
under the multi-party System can be less than 40% of the entire adult populati-
on. 
Peoples of Africa have had a long expérience of the implications of the above 
State of affairs. Events have clearly shown that they find it highly intolérable. 
Since it is a grave risk to be or to remain in opposition, it is no surprise that 
political parties are not only seen to be, but are actually mainly concerned 
with winning votes.28 This is the dominant character of their debates even in 
the parliament. Hardly any space is left for the parties to deal seriously with 
issues affecting the various segments of the society. On account of such a 
phenomenon the indispensability of pressure groups which are popularly refer-
red to as 'civil societies' has become unquestionable.29 World wide such 
groups often take to the streets to force the governments to wake up to their 
responsibilities. Kimmerle quite correctly remarked that 'Liberal democracy is 
weakening under the straggles of diverse pressure groups.'30 Why must there 
be a governmental arrangement which requires to be so pressurized? How 
effective could the pressure groups be? Very often they are on the streets 
protesting either over completed governmental actions, or over actions which a 
government has got the parliament to give a legal protection to, or over 
actions which a government is certain the parliament must endorse. No 
amount of mass mobilization can make such governmental actions illegal or 
unconstitutional. Ultimately, therefore, the civil societies or pressure groups, 
the opposition party or parties, and the Citizens at large must wait for the next 
round of élections to see if they can remove such a government. A i l thèse 
Problems can help to understand the plight of Western democracy in Africa. 
They will also help to see why Africans have started to examine their own 
traditional forms of democracy. 
As has already been noted, a political party or a coalition which 
controls the required majority can form the government and pursue its own 
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programmes without any référence to the rest of the political parties. Yet those 
political parties could have a following of about 60% of the entire adult 
population. A Nigérian civilian président in 1979 won the élection with only 
33.76% of the votes cast. Thus there is an urgent need for Africans to look 
inward in order to see if something better can be found there. 
Tenets of pre-colonial African democracy 
A question which may be asked is: What is African democracy? Is there 
indeed any African democracy? If there is, how does it function? Questions 
such as the above tend to reveal a certain amount of doubt about the subject 
under discussion. Conceptually or linguistically they seem to lead to some 
scepticism. Democracy is etymologically Greek in origin. Multi-party demo-
cracy which is largely différent from the Greek practice arguably dérives from 
it. Both are ail the same Western. Could there have been a traditional or pre-
colonial African democracy? Is there any indigenous term or word by which it 
was known? Such lines of thought have led some people to treat every pre-
colonial African political arrangement as anything but démocratie. V . G . 
Simiyu, for example, asserted that 'In Black Africa, whether the political 
system was that of the highly centralized states or the amorphous non-centrali-
zed communities, it did not belong to a démocratie tradition. They were 
rudiments of démocratie principles and practices ... but it would be dangerous 
to equate those practices with advanced forms of democracy.'31 By an advan-
ced form of democracy Simiyu meant nothing but the problematic Western 
multi-party majority raie democracy. If democracy is nothing but the Western 
partisan political Organization, then, there would be no point in talking of 
African democracy at ail. However, the attraction which democracy has for 
Africans is that its philosophical meaning agrées largely with certain forms of 
African pre-colonial political Organization. It is the government of the people, 
by the people, and for the people. 
Several authors have stressed the fact that in pre-colonial Africa, décisions 
were taken on the basis of consensus. This has become widely referred to as 
African consensus democracy. Various forms of consensus democracy have 
emerged as being typical of pre-colonial Africa. In the words of K . A . Busia, 
'When a Council, each member of which was the représentative of a lineage, 
met to discuss matters affecting the whole community, it had always to 
grapple with the problem of reconciling sectional and common interests. In 
order to do this, the members had to talk things over: they had to listen to ail 
the différent points of view. So strong was the value of solidarity that the chief 
aim of the councillors was to reach unanimity, and they talked tili this was 
achieved. Some have singled out this feature of talking tili unanimity was 
reached as the cardinal principle of African democracy.'32 In fact, only very 
little doubts might still exist regarding the reality of African democracy. Even 
the concept of 'parliamentary democracy' is not new to Africans. Mokwugo 
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Okoye has noted that 'it is merely tribal government formalized by modern 
conventions.'33 He added that 'there is nothing new in the idea of représentati-
on, or of mandate to govern entrusted by the Community to fhe rulers, even in 
the idea of removal of inept or evil government by conventional means.'34 
However, what is new in contemporary parliamentary government in Africa, 
is fhe System of party government based on votes. It is essentially the structu-
ral and institutionalized opposition that is new in Africa. The old tribal 
democracy was based on rotational représentation and division of labour, on 
consensus and a rational coordination of Community interests and views; in 
this way, it avoided the monopoly and frustration inhérent in the Western two-
party or multi-party System in which the winner takes ai l . 3 5 
One of fhe models of African consensus democracy is fhe Igbo model. Among 
the Igbo décision by consensus applies both to the meetings of the Council of 
elders and to the gênerai assembly of the village. It has to be stressed that 
Igbo form of consensus democracy is not very unique in Africa. Notwifhstan-
ding its local peculiarities, it is based on fhe same principle which obtains 
among many ofher African peoples and it shares the common characteristics of 
African democracy in terms of the concepts of communalism, solidarity, 
consensus, extended family system and populär participation or représentation. 
In fhe words of C. Nze, 'Communalism which is fhe African-Igbo man's 
answer and offer to those in search of a mode of living, contains the germ of 
salvation ... as it is in its fullness a consensus democracy ... It is a pattern of 
living which guarantees social solidarity and cohésion. It has a unifying 
strength and it can unité families, villages, towns, countries, continents and 
the world. ' 3 6 
In an attempt to understand how consensus democracy works I took an 
active part in Igbo consensus democracy within my Community. At présent, 
one of my uncles is the head of the Community being its oldest living maie. 
Another is diviner and very versed in Igbo tradition. In addition, I conducted 
an extensive research on Igbo political Systems using questionnaire and oral 
interview mefhods. I also collected many written constitutions which stipulate 
the current methods of decision-making in différent Igbo communities. A i l 
thèse sources have been combined to provide far-reaching data on Igbo 
consensus democracy. 
Under the African-Igbo consensus democracy two broad features are most 
important. They concern the nature of the geo-political units wifhin a polity as 
well as the modes of représentation and decision-making process. In a polity, 
for example a village-group or town, there are constituting villages, each of 
which is usually semi-autonomous, wifh its own leadership. For issues that 
concern the entire polity or village-group, ail the constituting groups must 
fully participate on the basis of equality. This must be so irrespective of 
obvious cases of inequality in terms of economic, démographie, territorial, 
social and all other forms of human and material resources. It is important to 
remark that the internal boundaries of such societies were not arbitrary like in 
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the présent African context. Equally significant is the fact that members of a 
polity or any of its sub-units usually have a common genealogical or historical 
background. Such factors tend to greatly enhance their acceptance of one 
another as members of a family. But their continued solidarity dépends a lot 
on the socio-political Organization which they subscribe to. 
The most acceptable form of socio-political Organization is the type 
which ensures populär and direct participation of ail adult maies or females in 
the decision-making process. This is obtained in situations where the number 
of people involved makes it not only possible but also fruitful. In other words, 
within a kindred group which is made up of families, ail the adult maies or 
females in their respective groups are expected to participate directly in the 
decision-making process. This is also expected at the village meeting in which 
ail the kindred groups must be présent. At the level of the village-group, 
however, direct participation of every adult male might become impractical. In 
such circumstances, it suffices when each of the constituting groups is equally 
represented in the decision-making process. Effort is thus made to ensure that 
at least one delegate, but usually two or more représentatives corne from each 
of the component units. It is important to note that the members of non-
kinship groups (title societies, age-grades and professional associations like 
diviners, traders, blacksmiths and carvers) are usually présent during Commu-
nity meetings to allow then to défend their own special interests as the need 
arises. 
Every effort must be made to ensure wide publicity and attendance of 
the meetings. Usually, the town or Community crier goes round using métal or 
wooden gongs to announce the time and place of the meeting. The venue is 
usually the Compound of the oldest man or the community square. If the 
meeting is to be held in the community square, as many adult members as 
possible are encouraged to attend and to take part fully in the délibérations. 
Whereas, if the meeting takes place in the Compound of the community head, 
mainly the members of the Council of elders or their représentatives are 
expected to attend. A very important practice is that the oldest man must 
contact the heads of other constituting groups in advance before the town crier 
can go round to inform the entire community. Nowadays publicity has become 
less difficult since printed and electronic media can be used. Unlike in the pre-
colonial era, décisions taken by the Council of elders or the gênerai assembly 
can now be preserved in written forms. I have acted personally on many 
occasions as a secretary in my community elders Council and gênerai assem-
bly. There are several other ways the modem society has enhanced or can 
enhance the practice of African-Igbo consensus democracy. 
What remains dominant under the African-Igbo democracy is that 
décisions must be taken on the basis of consensus. The fact that the constitu-
ting sub-units in a polity are represented on the basis of equality ensures that 
the numerically strong and the numerically weak are each entitled to equal say 
in the decision-making process. It is not like the meeting of shareholders in 
which one shareholder can speak louder than the rest of the members. Effort 
is made not to institutionalize such inequalities which lead to domination and 
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oppression. The economic giant must accept that he might not become a war 
gênerai. Besides, despite the diversity of talents, if the community must 
survive, every member must be at the service of others. Generally, this 
fundamental equality is allowed to characterize even their economic 
relationship: on the issue of revenue génération and distribution (a problematic 
field in contemporary African politics), for example, the sub-units must décide 
by consensus which formula to adopt. For instance, they décide by consensus 
whether input into the génération of common revenue must be on the basis of 
equality or proportionality (which entails that the weakest and strongest 
respectively must bear the least and the greatest bürden). Any formula they 
eventually adopt would automatically serve as their basis of revenue distributi-
on. In taking such a décision the least advantaged unit is usually allowed to 
have the last word on the choice of the available alternatives. Since such mat-
ters are very crucial they cannot be treated in the absence of any of the 
component groups. Likewise, none of the constituting groups can afford 
inadéquate, poor or irresponsible représentation. Some authors tend to deny 
the possibility of voting in African concensus democracy, claiming that the 
notion of political majority and minority is not part of the African tradition.37 
But I know from participatory expérience that sometimes some issues can be 
unanimously accepted to be put to vote. In such circumstances adéquate care 
must be taken to préserve the solidarity of the community. 
Another feature of the Igbo consensus democracy is that powers were 
not divided into that of the executive, legislative and judiciary as in the 
Western tradition. On the contrary, the same Council of elders or gênerai 
assembly can exercise the executive, legislative and judicial powers. 
One of the major limitations of the African-Igbo form of democracy is that it 
makes a distinction between maie and female The right to participate in the 
community decision-making process is open to only the adult maies. Women 
can attend only on invitation. However, those women also hold their own 
separate assembly in which they take décisions on the basis of consensus. This 
arrangement has been widely referred to as dual-sex system. (Référence can be 
made to Kamene Okonjo's 'The Dual-Sex Political System in Operation: Igbo 
Women and Community Politics in Midwestern Nigeria'.) It may be necessary 
to point out that the gap between the différent gender-based political 
organizations varies from one community to another. In a joint meeting of 
both sexes, usually the maie head of the community présides. The ideals of 
consensus democracy are often maintained. But the male group still exercises 
a measure of control over the female counterpart. Thus despite the active 
participation of women in the activities of the community a considérable 
degree of sexual inequality is maintained. 
115 
Frank Uyanne 
The task of democracy in contemporary Africa 
A major problem which contemporary Africa faces is how to overcome the 
limitations of Western démocratie models which recognize the reality of 
mainly individuals but treat groups as if they do not exist. There is every need 
to tackle such problems of demoeratization in Africa not only from the theo-
retical but also from the practical points of view. It has been demonstrated that 
the principle of one person one vote, which is largely a game of numbers, 
cannot in theory or in practice eliminate the above problems. As the 'African 
Leadership Forum' put it 'Our own brand of democracy must be sensitive to 
our multi-national status in which the fostering of national unity and cultural 
identity, enthronement of justice and equality as well as the particularization of 
the will of all the sections of the society are made indispensable attributes of 
the polity.' 3 8 
In my opinion, since the Western multi-party democracy has largely 
failed, or has led to serious crisis at least in Africa, it might be useful to try 
the traditional African alternative models. Perhaps in the process certain 
aspects of both African and Western forms of democracy can be found useful 
for the construction of a new model of democracy. Howe ver, the extent to 
which eifher of the two traditions is relevant must dépend strictly on the pro-
blems referred to above. 
In order to re-establish the principle of consensus democracy in post-colonial 
Africa, it is necessary to restructure the internal geographical boundaries of 
each African country with due respect to its constituting ethnie groups. 
Worthy of note is that many modern political sub-units in Africa have virtually 
nothing to do with the people. In Nigeria, for example, there are two levels of 
fédéral constituencies, namely, the wider level from which Senators are elected 
and the narrower one from which the candidates for the House of 
Représentatives are elected. Both catégories of sub-units are respectively about 
90 and 600 in number. In each of the 30 states there are numerous State 
constituencies. About 6000 legislative units called wards have been created out 
of about 500 local government Councils. The candidates for the above legislati-
ve units must belong to any of the recognized political parties. Having been 
elected nothing more is expected to happen between them and the people who 
elected them. To a very large extent this negates the African or speeifieally 
the Igbo concept of représentation. The idea of a représentative who must be 
either in principle or in practice independent of those he is representing is 
incompatible with the African tradition. Worse still, under this type of 
Western democracy none of thèse candidates can be withdrawn by those who 
elected him. The electorate must wait for three or more years to vote another 
candidate who might be a worse représentative. The risks are thus enormous. 
Under the African consensus democracy the situation is différent. The flow of 
information between the représentative and the electorate must remain constant 




In order to tackle the above problems adequately, the internal boundaries of 
each country in Africa must be harmonized. For instance, in Nigeria all the 
traditional boundaries which define the ethnie groups and those that define all 
the modern geo-political sub-units must be reconciled. Already, the 
government is under constant pressure to create more states, local Councils and 
wards. This indiscriminate création cannot solve the present problems. Like 
most African countries Nigeria is a fédération, the nature of whose 
composition has remained too vague. This is due to the fact that hardly any 
serious attempt has been made to understand its ethnie composition. The 
proposed harmonization exercise seems, therefore, to be an imperative. 
Having harmonized both the traditional and modern internal boundaries an 
appropriate network of sub-units will émerge. Just as was the case in pre-
colonial Africa, such new boundaries will tend to be more stable. In line wifh 
the spirit of consensus democracy, it must be ensured that each of the emer-
ging sub-units is represented in government on the basis of equality. This will 
accordingly shift emphasis away from the interests of the political parties or 
the actors, to fhose of the constituencies. 
Although in pre-colonial Africa a représentative group like the Council 
of elders exercised all the powers of government, in a contemporary African 
country the principle of séparation of powers can be adapted to the African 
democratie model. In ofher words, three separate organs respectively compo-
sed of the représentatives of the sub-units on the basis of equality must be 
established. The three organs shall be respectively responsible for the exercise 
of the executive, legislative and judicial powers. The représentatives in each of 
the fhree organs shall be directly accountable to fheir various sub-units. In this 
way debates in the parliament, for example, will reflect bofh the parochial and 
gênerai or common interests. This type of arrangement will generate more 
diverse ideas thereby making décisions to be more représentative but also 
more difficult to reach. In my opinion, such difficulties are quite understand-
able and worthwhile. There is hardly any other way to realize the goal of 
democracy in contemporary Africa. 
At the executive level, the représentatives will elect a presiding officer 
from their members. He may be called a president, prime minister or - better 
still - an appropriate African term may be adopted. Ofher représentatives and 
this presiding officer will constitute the cabinet or government. The whole 
problem of national or fédéral character which must be reflected in the 
executive appointments can be most decisively solved under this consensus 
democratie arrangement. The president as truly a primus inter pares cannot 
take certain steps without due consultation with other représentatives in the 
cabinet. A government so composed is in a better position to at least know the 
problems of the people in order to offer appropriate solutions to them. Such 
problems can be promptly presented to the government from any corner of the 
country with the assurance that it will be adequately treated. There will be no 




The appointaient of the judicial officers by the government or the executive is 
the most fundamental ground of the weakness of the judiciary under the 
Western démocratie models. There was a report that Tn Ghana, for the Court 
of Appeal giving a judgement which was to the préjudice of the government 
headed by Kwame Nkrumah, the Chief Judge was dismissed; the judges were 
also dismissed.'39 A président of the USA was said to have considered the 
appointaient of a judge who decided a case against him (the président) as one 
of his greatest mistakes. Democracy in the USA was said to have remained in 
a State of 'judicial emergency', since Clinton has reduced the number of 
vacant seats to be occupied by judges (113 vacant seats under the Bush 
administration) by six only. 4 0 Likewise, it has been observed that in Nigeria 
the judiciary was by far the weakest of the three arms of government.41 Under 
consensus democracy such a problem would not arise. The constituting sub-
units must send their respective représentatives to the judiciary. A body so 
composed will be in a better position to take care of judicial matters in the 
polity. This is by far a better condition for the required judicial impartiality. 
In such a context, courts must be careful in setting précédents because once 
set they can no longer be easily set aside. This model also créâtes the 
appropriate forum for the reform of the existing laws in Africa. 
African consensus democracy makes the principle of séparation of 
powers more meaningful since it makes the three arms of government more 
independent and so more effective as an in-built mechanism for checks and 
balances. They are each and jointly accountable to the people from whom they 
dérive their authority. Since the consensus System does not require the 
existence of political parties a free atmosphère prevails during délibérations in 
the différent arms of government. The possibility for any political party to 
high-jack the government by the control of political powers is eliminated. Such 
a ground for dictatorial powers does not exist under this model. 
Concerning the 'universal human rights', it might be necessary to stress 
that like the opposition parties, pressure groups or civil societies, an individual 
may exercise enormous freedom of speech but with little or no influence 
within the Western multi-party democracy. His real and ultimate right is to 
cast his vote. The limitedness of freedom of speech can be understood better 
by the ex-presidents, ex-prime ministers and so on. Which government is 
prepared to listen to whom? Members of a political party basically want only a 
certain number of votes which gives them the licence to rule for a certain 
number of years. Since issues will constantly be referred to the constituencies, 
individuals have greater chances to partieipate in the decision-making process 
under the consensus démocratie model. He is also better disposed to listen to 
alternative views since there are no political walls to jeopardize free discussi-
on. It is an absurdity for an individual to cast his vote only to ultimately find 
himself powerless, hopeless and far away from the emerging government. 
What sense would the talks about human rights make in such a context? Why 
will he not develop political apathy in his helplessness before diese govern-
ments widely known for their violation of the promised human rights? 
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A question which is often asked is how decisions could be taken if, for 
example, a majority and a minority maintain incompatible stands. This is a 
problem. But this type of problem means one thing in the context of Western 
tradition and another within that of Africa. Under the Western multi-party 
democracy the majority or the minority is conceived of as composed of mere 
individuals. This obtains in every election within the polity or any of its sub-
units. On the contrary, African consensus democracy shows that those indivi-
duals could belong to one or more of the constituting groups. In other words, 
a minority or majority could comprise members of an ethnic group. If any 
stalemate arises, therefore, the members must see it as a great threat to their 
solidarity, and must treat the problem with greater sense of responsibility. The 
right of every group to be heard is intrinsic under the consensus democracy. 
According to Nze, 'Just as the individual who makes his choice needs to be 
free, a group or community must be free to choose what is in its interest.'42 It 
would be unfair to structurally prevent any group from defending its interests. 
The failure of Western multi-party majority rule democratic models to protect 
the interests of the disadvantaged groups generates a fear of domination and 
oppression that makes it impossible for it to thrive in Africa. 
In conclusion, the plight of democracy in contemporary Africa can serve as 
the basis of a more critical re-appraisal of the democratic models which have 
so far dominated the democratization process. There is nothing so far to 
suggest that any given model of democracy is optimal. On the contrary, what 
has emerged from the entire critical situation is the need to take fundamental 
steps to save the present ugly situation. A very important goal is to make sure 
that all the groups in a polity are adequately represented in the decision-
making process. Once this is done, hardly any group will continue to agitate 
for a separate existence or autonomy. As has been demonstrated above, this 
task demands a critical dialogue between African and Western traditions. 
Perhaps, the most important contribution the former can make is its emphasis 
on a type of equal representation of the component groups in a polity, while 
the latter will provide all the benefits of a modern society. Therefore, the 
democratization option for contemporary Africans might be neither the 
Western nor the traditional African model in its entity, but one which must 
have benefited from both traditions. 
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